在康德以前，当人们在强调知识必须符合对象的时候，对象只有一个，我们或者能够认识它，或者不能认识它。当康德以先天认识形式为科学知识的普遍必然性提供根据的时候，对象就被划分成了两个方面，一方面是事物对我们的表现（Erscheinungen），我们对之可以认识而且可以形成普遍必然的科学知识；一方面是事物自身（Dinge an sich），它们超出了我们的认识形式之外，因而是不可知的。这就意味着，我们是而且只能从我们的角度出发认识事物，认识形式虽然保证了知识的普遍必然性，但也是一种限制。的确，康德把空间与时间看作是感性先天直观形式而归之于主观性的观点经常为人们所垢病，但是换一个角度看，我们所习惯的时空关系并非就是普遍绝对的时空关系。爱因斯坦之后，我们虽然不能感知但却能够设想不同于我们这个世界的时空关系的多维空间。即使我们否认存在着先天认识形式，也不能排除认识主体在认识活动中的作用。换言之，认识并非如洛克所说的那样是一张白纸，我们的立场、观点和方法，我们的概念和认识形式与结构，无不对认识发生影响，因而不可能按照事物本身的样子认识事物。
Endless Explorations of Kant’s Philosophy, Together with Several Methodological Problems in the Research of History of Philosophy
[Abstract] In the year of 2004, the 200th anniversary of the death of Immanuel Kant, the commemorations of the great philosopher are to be held all over the world. Why so everlasting is the study of Kant? How does a kind of historical philosophy have realistic significance to our own times? Which thoughts in the history of philosophy are outdated and which updated? In the memorial of Kant, this essay will discuss several problems concerning with the methodology of the history of philosophy, attempting to explain in the perspective of hermeneutics that the historical status of a philosopher is embodied in his approaches to solve the philosophical problems with which he was faced. With respect of Kant’s philosophy, the origin of its everlasting values lies in the problems with which both we and Kant are faced, while his solutions still are plausible approaches of philosophy nowadays.